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AUTHENTICITY IN THE ENHANCEMENT DEBATE
ABSTRACT. Our knowledge of the human brain and the inﬂuence of pharmaco-
logical substances on human mental functioning is expanding. This creates new pos-
sibilities to enhance personality and character traits. Psychopharmacological
enhancers, as well as other enhancement technologies, raise moral questions con-
cerning the boundary between clinical therapy and enhancement, risks and safety,
coercion and justice. Other moral questions include the meaning and value of identity
and authenticity, the role of happiness for a good life, or the perceived threats to
humanity. Identity and authenticity are central in the debate on psychopharmaco-
logicalenhancers. Inthis paper,I ﬁrstdescribetheconcerns atissuehereasextensively
propoundedbyCarlElliott.Next,IaddressDavidDeGraziastheory,whichholdsthat
there are no fundamental identity-related and authenticity-related arguments against
enhancement technologies. I argue, however, that DeGrazias line of reasoning does
not succeed in settling these concerns. His conception of identity does not seem able to
account for the importance we attach to personal identity in cases where personal
identity is changed through enhancement technology. Moreover, his conception of
authenticity does not explain the reason why we ﬁnd inauthentic values objectionable.
A broader approach to authenticity can make sense of concerns about changes in
personal identity by means of enhancement technologies.
KEY WORDS: authenticity, autonomy, cosmetic psychopharmacology, enhance-
ment, neuroscience, personal identity
INTRODUCTION
Our knowledge of the human brain and about the inﬂuence of
pharmacological substances on human mental functioning is
expanding and, increasingly, this creates new possibilities for
enhancing the mental functioning of humans. Some examples are
brain–machine interfaces (BMI) that may allow interaction between
neural tissue and electronic transducers, and technologies such as
deep brain stimulation (DBS) and transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS). Psychopharmacology has been characterized as being ‘‘on the
leading edge of neurotechnology.’’
1 A number of drugs are already
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use Ritalin while cramming for their exams. Modafinil, a promising
remedy for sleep loss that improves alertness and cognitive perfor-
mance, is being tested for use in the army.
2 Donepezil, medically
indicated for mild to moderate Alzheimers disease, was tested in
healthy pilots in a flight simulator; it improved retention of training
and episodic (long-term) memory.
3 Future cognition enhancers may
be more effective because these drugs target the specific mechanisms
that underlie memory formation.
These developments compel us to reﬂect on the moral questions
they evoke and on the need for public policy. Some of the moral
questions relate to the boundary between clinical therapy and
enhancement, risks and safety, coercion and justice. Other moral
questions involve the meaning and value of identity and authenticity,
the role of happiness for a good life or the perceived threats to
humanity. Here, I will focus on questions regarding identity and
authenticity—a central issue in the debate. Proponents hold that
psychopharmacological substances can help users to become who
they really are and thus strengthen their identity and authenticity.
Critics, however, believe that the substances will lead to inauthen-
ticity, normalization, and socially-enforced adaptation of behavior
and personality. Some even fear dehumanization in the long run.
Proponents as well as critics of enhancement technologies share the
moral ideal of authenticity. However, they understand authenticity
differently.
4
I ﬁrst describe the argumentation of Carl Elliott, who raises
identity-related and authenticity-related concerns about psycho-
pharmacological enhancement technologies. Next, I consider David
DeGrazias reasoning to the effect that there are no fundamental
identity-related and authenticity-related arguments against enhance-
ment technologies. The views of Elliott and DeGrazia may be char-
acterized as examples of the opposing views between critics and
proponents of enhancement technologies. My aim is to show that
DeGrazia does not succeed in settling the concerns of critics, such as
Elliott, completely. DeGrazias exposition of identity cannot account
for the importance we attach to identity in cases in which personal
identity is changed through enhancement technology. Moreover, his
account of autonomy—which includes authenticity—cannot sufﬁ-
ciently cover the reason why we ﬁnd some enhancement technologies
problematic. Finally, I conclude that we need alternative broader
interpretations of authenticity in order to debate enhancement
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cine has to deal with the demand for enhancement technologies.
COSMETIC PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY: A THREAT
TO AUTHENTICITY?
The value and impact of cosmetic psychopharmacology and other
enhancement technologies have been heavily debated, and Carl
Elliott is one of the main contributors. Elliott is concerned with a
particular sort of worry about cosmetic psychopharmacology: a
certain unease with the use of psychopharmacological substances by
people who suffer from existential ‘‘illnesses,’’ who ‘‘feel disoriented
and lost in the world.’’
5 Elliott asks his readers whether a psychiatrist
should prescribe Prozac to a man suffering from spiritual emptiness
and alienation: ‘‘an accountant living in Downers Grove, Illinois who
comes to himself one day and says, Jesus Christ, is this it? A Snapper
lawn mower and a house in the suburbs?’’
6 Some of us may be of the
opinion that the psychiatrist should abstain from prescribing Prozac
in this case because existential problems, like alienation, belong to the
human condition. This answer to Elliotts question may run along the
lines of the report by George W. Bushs Presidents Council on
Bioethics; according to this Council, enhancement may threaten our
sense both of human dignity and of what is naturally human.
7 We
may forget what full flourishing or true human happiness really
entails. Full human flourishing comprises more than mere happy
feelings and requires a connection to reality, as opposed to the
unnatural or artificial improvement of mood that drugs bring about.
For example, the use of memory blunters is considered to be morally
problematic because it might cause a loss of empathy if we would
habitually erase our negative experiences, and because it would vio-
late the human duty to remember and oppose crimes and atrocities.
According to Elliott, our concern and ambivalence with respect to the
use of enhancers is rooted in our own form of life. Elliot does not
focus on human beings in general but on 20
th century Westerners and
their specific experiences of alienation. To be more precise, Elliott
claims that our concerns stem from a framework by which we
determine whether our lives have sense or meaning. Following
Charles Taylor and Lionel Trilling, he calls this framework an
ethic of authenticity. He sketches two important features of this
framework. The first feature is the notion of life as a project, i.e., the
TRUE TO ONESELF? 287idea that whether our life has meaning is self-determined and,
moreover, that we see our life as ‘‘planned undertakings’’ which we in
a significant way control and for which we bear responsibility.
8 A
second feature is the idea that there is no universal answer to the
question ‘‘How should I live?’’ Every individual is unique and has to
look inward to determine ones own original way of life. In short,
authenticity is a framework as well as a moral ideal: ‘‘the idea that we
each have a way of living that is uniquely our own, and that we are
each called to live in our own way rather than that of someone else.’’
9
According to Elliott an ethic of authenticity is related to the
concerns regarding the use of drugs, such as Prozac, for enhancement
purposes. First, if meaningful life is linked with authentic life, then
there is the possibility of inauthentic life, i.e., a life that is not
uniquely and truly yours. Some people feel unease with respect to the
use of Prozac in cases of alienation because a personality change
seems to be in conﬂict with an ethic of authenticity: even though
Prozac may give you a better personality, it is not your personality.
10
Secondly, Elliott suggests that there is a strained relationship
between a medical approach in these cases and the idea of uniqueness
that is included in an ethic of authenticity. Many Americans expe-
rience a sense of meaninglessness if they think their lives are not
unique.
Finally, Elliott stresses the relationship between an ethic of
authenticity and the idea of self-fulﬁlment. Self-fulﬁlment is a crucial
aspect of a meaningful life. It contains the idea that we have to pursue
our values and our talents and that we waste our lives if we fail; it is a
higher form of life, a moral ideal. This ideal can be recognized in the
ambivalence regarding the use of Prozac: on the one hand, Prozac
can be valued as a means to strive for and realize a meaningful and
happy life, but on the other hand, the idea of a meaningful life
involves authenticity and uniqueness, discovering your own values by
looking inward instead of being dependent on an antidepressant.
Elliott suggests that the ideal of self-fulﬁlment may turn out to be
oppressive; if you feel unhappy and think you have a meaningless life,
you have a duty to change it because you do not want to waste your
life. ‘‘If Prozac is seen as a kind of ticket to self-fulﬁlment, and
self-fulﬁlment is your duty, then maybe we can begin to understand
why Prozac has become so wildly popular among Americans.’’
11
It would hardly surprise us if Elliott argued that the psychiatrist
should not prescribe Prozac for the man in his example; his concern is
that this use would invite inauthenticity. A person may be better off
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dicament and not being aware of it. As Parens asserts, critics like
Elliott do not want to glorify suffering but they do want to show that
compromising our awareness is bad: ‘‘it threatens to separate us from
who we really are and how the world really is.’’
12
Although Elliotts explanation of our concerns as rooted in the
ideal of authenticity seems plausible, his interpretation of authenticity
remains rather unprecise. He explicitly states that he does not adhere
to the view of the idea of an essentialist self: a self with ﬁxed and
essential characteristics, a self with a core identity, but he does not
elaborate on this point. In his recent book, Human Identity and
Bioethics, DeGrazia explicitly discusses the concerns of Elliott and
The Presidents Council on Bioethics but argues that there are
no fundamental identity-related arguments against enhancement
technology.
13 Is he right?
COSMETIC PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY: A MEANS
TO SELF-IMPROVEMENT AND AUTHENTICITY?
DeGrazia thoroughly analyses the concept of personal identity and
applies his theory of human identity to several pressing bioethical
issues, such as the authority of advance directives and the moral
permissibility of enhancement technologies.
14 DeGrazia makes use of
a distinction between numerical and narrative identity. Numerical
identity concerns the question ‘‘What makes a person at one time and
a person at some other time one and the same person?’’
15 How can
things persist, how can human beings maintain their identity despite
major changes physically as well as mentally? According to a psy-
chological approach, we are essentially persons and our identity
persists in psychological continuity—a perspective which DeGrazia
labels Personalism. Another view holds that we are essentially brains
with the functional capacity to support consciousness—this is the
embodied mind account.
DeGrazia argues for a biological approach because this would be
metaphysically more plausible, coherent, and consistent with
‘‘educated common sense.’’
16 Human persons are essentially human
animals, members of the species homo sapiens. The term ‘‘essentially’’
must be noted here. In DeGrazias theory, essence and existence are
linked. That is because the question ‘‘What are the criteria for a
person to continue to exist over time?’’ is related to another question
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The idea that I can survive some transformations implies that there
must be criteria for my identity and that ‘‘the basic kind that deter-
mines those criteria also determines my essence.’’
17 ‘‘Essentially’’ is
defined as the conditions of persistence: ‘‘If property X is both nec-
essary and sufficient for the things existence, then X is the essence of
that thing.’’
18 According to a biological approach the persistence
conditions are those of the human organism: we are essentially
human animals. This approach is clearly distinguished from a
personalist view: even members of our species who will never attain
the status of persons, such as anencephalics who do not possess the
capacity for consciousness, belong to the species of human animals.
Numerical identity is a prerequisite, an essential condition for
narrative identity. Narrative identity concerns different questions,
such as ‘‘Who am I?’’ and ‘‘Which characteristics, acts, and values
make me the person I am?’’ Under normal conditions, we are more
than human animals: we have self-knowledge and a self-narrative,
which makes us capable of planning and decision-making. These
capacities are sufﬁcient for moral agency and moral responsibility,
but many of us want even more: we want to develop our talents, to
shape our personality, to be a certain person, to create ourselves. In
short, according to DeGrazia, human persons are: 1) essentially
human animals and 2) ‘‘characteristically self-narrators and (where
circumstances permit) self-creators who care about continuing as
such.’’
19
This account of human persons is applied to the issue of
enhancement technologies, including cosmetic surgery, cosmetic
psychopharmacology, and genetic enhancements. DeGrazia argues
that there are no fundamental identity-related arguments against
enhancement technologies, such as cosmetic psychopharmacology.
There are no identity-related arguments that can justify prohibiting
or even discouraging the use of such technologies. According to
DeGrazia, critics of enhancement technologies neglect the distinction
between numerical and narrative identity; they reason as follows:
1. Enhancement technology E alters a persons identity.
2. Altering a persons identity is highly problematic. Therefore,
3. Enhancement technology E is highly problematic.
20
DeGrazia argues that this reasoning is ﬂawed: the ﬁrst premise can
only be true if narrative identity were at stake (because enhancement
technology cannot literally destroy a person and replace him with
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numerical identity. Therefore the conclusion cannot be drawn.
THE IMPORTANCE OF IDENTITY
Although DeGrazia believes this settles concerns regarding identity,
however, I do not believe that he succeeds in eliminating the kind
of identity-related and authenticity-related concerns of critics like
Elliott.
The ﬁrst reason I think DeGrazias theory does not succeed in
eliminating Elliotts concern has to do with his account of identity.
DeGrazia argues that enhancement technologies can only be highly
problematic in the case that numerical identity is at stake. Moral
status is solely attributed to numerical identity. But what do we really
ﬁnd important about identity?
According to Schechtman, with whom I agree on this point, we
attach importance to personality because of four basic features of
personal identity.
21 These four features are: 1) moral responsibility (a
person can only be held responsible for his own actions); 2) self-
interested concern (‘‘there is a type of interest one properly has only
for oneself’’); 3) compensation (‘‘a person can only be compensated
for his sacrifices by benefits that accrue to him’’); and 4) survival (we
are not solely interested in biological continuity but especially in
psychological continuity, that one will still be around in the future).
Schechtman argues that psychological continuity theorists—who
argue that personal identity should be deﬁned in terms of the con-
tinuation of a single psychological life—are unable to explain the
importance attached to identity. The reason is that they try to answer
the question of personal identity in terms of re-identiﬁcation: asking
whether the consciousness at t2 is the same consciousness as that at t1
(which is similar to the question of numerical identity).
22 It seems that
psychological continuity theorists find themselves in a Catch–22 sit-
uation: if they manage to develop a logically consistent answer to the
re-identiﬁcation question they will be liable to the extreme claim (that
is, they can not account for the importance we attach to identity),
while a notion of sameness of consciousness over time that does
account for the importance of the four features does not seem to be
logically consistent. Instead of rejecting our intuitions and forcing
ourselves to argue that persons should be identiﬁed by either their
body or their psyche, Schechtman suggests an alternative view. There
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to different questions.’’ The re-identiﬁcation question can best be
answered by a bodily criterion whereas the characterization question
(‘‘which values, desires, views, and other psychological characteristics
make someone the person she is?’’) is most properly answered by a
psychologically-based criterion. Both questions can be asked about
the same person. We are interested whether the person who is
arrested for having committed a crime is really the same person as the
one who committed the crime (for example by checking DNA)
because we think this is pertinent for determining moral responsi-
bility. Although both questions are related, Schechtman underlines
the different perspectives the questions provide on identity.
The re-identiﬁcation question is an important question of personal
identity in certain situations, but only the characterization question is
able to account for the importance attached to personal identity.
Whereas the re-identiﬁcation question requires an absolute answer,
the answer to this question can be gradual: someone can be more or
less responsible, more or less alive. As an example Schechtman quotes
a patient of Peter Kramers: ‘‘She had not been alive before taking an
antidepressant.’’
23 We do not need to see this as just a metaphor.
Although there is an important difference between a patient who lost
consciousness permanently and someone who is being abused and
lost her identity, they are all conditions on a continuum: ‘‘... the
degree to which a person is alive, and hence survives, seems linked to
the degree to which her actions, experiences, and characteristics are
her own—the degree to which her identity is expressed in her life.’’
24
Stories of radical changes in human lives, whether by means of
drugs or other technologies, show how these may affect personal
narrative identity in such a way that survival of identity is threatened.
For example, the story of a man suffering from obsessive-compulsive
disorder; he used medication and had psychotherapy for twenty-two
years without any effect.
25 As a last resort he chose a new treatment
called Deep Brain Stimulation: a surgical implantation of a medical
device which sends electrical impulses to specific parts of the brain.
After the surgical implantation it took one year to adjust the elec-
trodes; every three weeks he had to go to the hospital to find the
optimal adjustment that would lessen the symptoms while preventing
side-effects. Some adjustments caused a hyper-energetic state: he was
tireless, impulsive, and assertive. Other adjustments caused an
intensely happy feeling. During this period of adjustment and
dramatic changes in character traits he seemed to be a different
L. L. E. BOLT 292person; friends and family did not recognize him as the person he
used to be and he even lost some friends. This shows that changes in
narrative identity do matter a lot.
DeGrazia argues that enhancement technologies can only be
problematic in cases where numerical identity is at stake. However,
numerical identity has very little relationship with the four basic
features that we care so deeply about. Narrative identity does; but
according to DeGrazia changes in narrative identity are not morally
problematic. DeGrazias account—in which numerical identity is
central—is thus not capable of explaining the importance we attach
to narrative identity and to changes in this identity. This is one reason
why his argument cannot settle the concerns of critics like Elliott.
MORAL CONCERNS REGARDING AUTHENTICITY
The second reason why DeGrazia, in my view, does not succeed in
setting concerns at rest has to do with his account of autonomy and
authenticity. DeGrazia argues that one cannot object to enhancement
technologies as long as autonomous choices are made and consid-
erations of safety and justice are taken into account. His deﬁnition of
autonomy subscribes to the view of Gerald Dworkin who analyses
autonomy as authenticity which requires higher-order identiﬁcation
with ones ﬁrst-order desires. This process of identiﬁcation has to be
free of alienating inﬂuences.
26 DeGrazia sharpens the analysis of
autonomy as follows: ‘‘A autonomously performs intentional action
X if and only if (1) A does X because she prefers to do X, (2) A has
this preference because she (at least dispositionally) identifies with
and prefers to have it, and (3) this identification has not resulted
primarily from influences that A would, on careful reflection,
consider alienating.’’
27 Not respecting the autonomous choice of
competent adults is morally problematic.
According to DeGrazia, authenticity as a concept, deﬁned as
‘‘being true to oneself’’ and as ‘‘presenting oneself to others as one
truly is,’’ does not set any additional limits.
28 Although it is prob-
lematic to deceive or cheat others and perhaps ourselves about who
we are, authenticity per se does not ‘‘add any morally significant
concern.’’
29 Concerns for problematic uses of enhancement technol-
ogies can be understood in terms of respect for autonomy and
honesty. Dishonesty is interpreted as systematic deception towards
others about who one really is and is characterized as inauthentic.
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Barbie doll.
30 She may be socialized by sexist norms; her desire to
change her appearance may not be her real desire if she is not aware
of these norms and their impact on her desire. In that case, her choice
is neither autonomous nor authentic (authentic in the sense of higher-
order identification with first-order desires). Our concerns about
authenticity and honesty are, in fact, concerns about autonomy.
According to DeGrazia, every self-creation project that is autono-
mous and honest is ipso facto authentic.
Does this account settle the concerns of critics? I do not think so
and, moreover, it does not seem to quiet the concerns of DeGrazia
himself. First, I believe DeGrazias notion of authenticity is too
narrow. DeGrazia introduces Chiang, a man who is brainwashed and
whose mission is to burn books and to torture intellectuals; Chiang is
even grateful for the brainwashing. In asking whether we should test
the legitimacy of an inﬂuence prospectively or retrospectively,
DeGrazia argues that a retrospective evaluation would be appropri-
ate: ‘‘If Chiang wants to burn books, identiﬁes with his desires,
understands the partys inﬂuence on him yet embraces this inﬂu-
ence—not just publicly but in his heart—then Chiang has genuinely
changed and his desire, I suggest, is autonomous, harmonizing as it
does with his current worldview.’’
31
In DeGrazias account, authenticity is fulﬁlled as long as critical
reﬂection has taken place and alienating inﬂuences are absent. Whe-
ther or not inﬂuences are alienating, however, seems to depend again
on critical reﬂection.
32 The emphasis on careful reflection, however,
does not capture the reason why we find certain influences on desire-
formation both alienating and problematic. As Insoo Hyun argues,
our reasons for judging someones values or choices as inauthentic has
to do with the circumstances in which his values are enclosed, ‘‘what
we find objectionable are the actual reasons why the people in such
situations possess their particular values.’’
33 The people in Huxleys
Brave New World are happy and would defend their values if required
and may even critically reflect on them, but their choices are not
autonomous: their values are not truly their own, and their values are
forced upon them by bio- and socio-technological engineering.
As Hyun argues, the authenticity condition requires a broader
approach, beyond the concept of critical reﬂection. Securing
authenticity involves more conditions: ‘‘the absence of certain
external, social constraints.’’
34 Concern about inauthentic values is
concern about persons being compelled to have the values they in fact
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(1) they are ‘‘denied access to alternatives that are reasonable and
presently available to others who have similar capacities and abili-
ties’’ and (2) when they are ‘‘barred from these other options for
reasons that are morally illegitimate.’’
35 Inauthentic values do not
exist solely in circumstances of brainwashing and manipulation but
may also occur in situations where reasonable alternatives are absent.
What is important is that people live in circumstances where rea-
sonable and legitimate alternatives remain open to them and where
they are able to challenge values. This broader notion of authenticity
is defined in a negative sense, based on the absence of certain cir-
cumstances, and upon a particular premise of the nature of the self,
namely peoples relational situation: ‘‘people come deeply embedded
in personal relationships and shared social roles and practices.’’
36 In
contrast, interpretations of authenticity in which critical reflection is
central seem to be based on a different premise, namely people as self-
detached individuals independently reflecting on their own values.
Second, it seems as if DeGrazias own concerns are not completely
settled by his own account. The example I have in mind here concerns
alterations (physically or mentally) that are done for frivolous rea-
sons. ‘‘One might agree that accidentally altering ones breasts, or
intentionally doing so to improve ones health, is beyond reproach,
while holding that intentionally doing so for something as frivolous as
cosmetic improvement is indefensible or at least highly problem-
atic.’’
37 DeGrazia is concerned about these kind of enhancements, but
his own account seems inadequate to explain or justify these concerns.
How can DeGrazia evaluate the choice of a woman to change her
appearance in order to improve her looks as frivolous and highly
problematicas long asherchoice isautonomous?DeGraziaspeculates
that this may have to do with insufficient self-respect. Although he
raises the question of whether authenticity and even autonomy require
self-respect, he unfortunately does not go deeper into this topic.
This example illustrates that DeGrazia may have some concerns
that are not adequately captured by his theoretical account of
personal identity and authenticity. Moreover, he seems to need a
thicker conception of personal identity, authenticity, and self-fulﬁl-
ment in order to make sense of his concerns regarding the use of
enhancement technology for frivolous reasons. I agree with Erik
Parens that even proponents of enhancement technologies have a less
formalistic idea of what being an authentic self or a self-fulﬁlled
person is than they are accustomed to acknowledging.
38 Consider, for
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ception of intimacy.
39 According to Parens, even honest proponents
would acknowledge that ‘‘enhancements’’ such as these are troubling
because giving people the idea of intimacy while genuine intimacy is
absent seems to conflict with the moral ideal of authenticity. If people
had ‘‘intimate’’ relationships as a result of this pill, they would not be
considered to be living authentically.
It is important to recognize that Parenss interpretation of
authenticity is different from that of Hyuns and DeGrazias.
Whereas Hyuns interpretation comes down to formulating condi-
tions that distinguish authentic from inauthentic values, Parens uses
authenticity as a moral ideal of self-fulﬁlment (at least in his analysis
of the debate). This interpretation is more in line with the views of
Elliott discussed earlier. I do agree with Parens and Elliott that
enhancement technologies raise questions that can not be answered
by retreating to a thin conception of the authentic self. We need a
thicker conception of what self-fulﬁlment and personhood mean.
However, this is a dangerous project. History shows how easily thick
conceptions of personhood and real happiness can undermine indi-
vidual freedom and autonomy. In our search for what is essential
about ourselves we have to be constantly aware of the question
that proponents such as Kramer and DeGrazia ask: ‘‘Who sets the
values?’’
40 Who determines which circumstances lead to alienation
and what self-fulfilment really means? Who determines when a
technology severs how one feels from how one lives?
POLICY AND CHALLENGES
As shown in the preceding section, authenticity can be interpreted in
different ways: as a more global conception referring to an ideal of
self-fulﬁlmentand‘‘thick’’personhood,orasamorenarrowconception
related to a speciﬁc account of autonomy and value formation.
Enhancement technologies confront us with new possibilities to
enhance human functions and characteristics. Troubling cases such as
the ‘‘perceived intimacy’’ pill demonstrate the need for a debate that
includes thick concepts of authentic personal identity, and reﬂects
both on the meaning of self-fulﬁlment and on what living truly or
authentically means.
41 Authenticity in this broad interpretation, as an
ideal of human flourishing, should play a role in the enhancement
debate. An important task of a government is therefore to foster and
support such a debate.
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understand as the normal or naturally human do not yet exist.
However, we need to respond to the question of how to deal with a
variety of psychopharmacological substances that are already being
used, in the grey area between medical treatment and human
enhancement. Should they be provided by physicians under certain
conditions? Or should they be regulated outside of the medical
realm, in a commercial setting? Synofzik has introduced a moral
framework for a medicine-on-demand which is built on the tradi-
tional principles of beneﬁcence, non-maleﬁcence and autonomy.
42
He proposes a continuum between a physicians firm recommen-
dations of an intervention at one end, to a refusal to intervene at
the other end. In between, physician and patient should deliberate
on the risks and benefits in the light of a patients own autonomous
preferences. The risk-benefit analysis of the physician has to be
based on general values instead of on his own subjective values.
Interesting issues here concern the degree to which a physician can
question the patients values, preferences (and their authenticity), or
can impose societys values on the client. If we choose DeGrazias
interpretation of authenticity this would imply that a physician
should carry out requests that are based on the clients self-con-
fessed values and preferences. A somewhat broader interpretation of
authenticity, such as Hyuns, requires a physician to do more than
carry out the clients requests—the physician can also question the
authenticity of the clients values; for example, the social influences
at work during their formation. Providing psychopharmacological
substances for enhancement purposes in a medical setting gives a
better opportunity to deliberate with the client and to explore her
motives than would a commercial setting. Consider, for instance,
Elliotts example of the accountant ‘‘living in Downers Grove, Illi-
nois who comes to himself one day and says, Jesus Christ, is this it?
A Snapper lawn mower and a house in the suburbs?’’
43 Although I
do not want to overstate the possibilities of physicians to determine
whether a persons values are authentic or not, to a certain extent it
must be possible to explore whether a clients values and choices are
manipulated or undermined and, as Hyun puts it, to inquire whe-
ther that person is able to challenge her values and to see whether
reasonable alternatives have been foreclosed. This interpretation of
authenticity demands more of physicians than taking a clients
values and choices as simply given.
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